Michigan Law Review
Volume 20

Issue 8

1922

Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts
Edwin W. Patterson
State University of Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Edwin W. Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts, 20 MICH. L. REV. 848 (1922).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol20/iss8/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MINISTERIAL AND DISCRETIONARY OFFICIAL ACTS
recent cases, one in Michigan and one in Iowa, bring up
T WO
again the insistent question of judicial control over administrative action and the oft-repeated distinction between "ministerial"
and "discretionary" official acts.
In Samuels v. Coitzens,1 plaintiff sought mandamus to compel the
mayor of Detroit to issue him a license to engage in the jewelry
business under an ordinance "to regulate and license" such 'businesses. The _ordinance, which was very short, provided that "no
person * * * shall engage in the business of selling jewelry * * *
without first having obtained a license from the mayor * * *" It
required a written application to the mayor, containing an agreement on the part of the applicant that "he will accept the license,
if granted him, and that it may be revoked at the will of the mayor."
A third section required the filing of a "sufficient surety bond" in
the sum of $200 "to cover any loss or damage to any citizen doing
business with such licensee," and required the payment of a license
fee of one dollar. Plaintiff tendered to the mayor a concededly
proper application and bond, but the mayor refused to grant a license
"for the reason that plaintiff had theretofore been in the habit of
deceiving and defraudit?-g the public as to the quality of the jewelry
sold by him, and had so conducted his business that it was not in
the public interest that he should be permitted to continue the same."
A judgment for defendant was affirmed, the court saying that the
ordinance conferred on the mayor "a reasonable discretion in the
issue of such license." In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Wiest, J.,
urged that the ordinance was void as conferring on the mayor "arbitrary" and "uncontrolled" power.
In Lloyd v. Ramsay,2 plaintiff sought mandamus and also invoked
certiorari to compel the Secretary of State of Iowa and the Executive Council to issue a certificate of incorporation to the "Federal
Oil Company." The statute3 contains the following provision:.
<')

"When articles of incorporation are presented to the Sec183 N. W. 925 (Mich., 1921).
183 N. W. 333 (Iowa, 1921).
a Iowa Code Supplement, 1913, Sec. 1610.

1

2

MINISTERIAL OFFICIAL ACTS

retary of State for the purpose of being filed, if he is satisfied that they are in proper form to meet the requirements
of law, that their object is a lawful one and not against public policy, that their plan of_ doing business, if any be provided for, is honest and lawful, he shall file them; but if he
is of the opinion that they are not in proper form to meet
the requirements of the law, or that their object is an
unlawful one, or against public policy, or that their plan of
doing business is dishonest or unlawful, he shall refuse to
file the same."
From an adverse decision of the Secretary an appeal to the
Executive Council (consisting of the Governor, Secretary, Treasurer and Auditor of the State) was provided for, and the same
grounds of decision were prescribed. The Secretary refused to
file plaintiff's articles b_ecause of the gross disproportion between
the amount of common and preferred stock ($5,000 common and
$195,000 preferred), which he "declared to be "against public policy,'' and the Executive Council sustained his decision on the ground
that "the said articles were contrary to good business practice." A
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, the court unanimously holding that the approval of articles under 'this statute was not a "purely
ministerial act," but involved the exercise of discretion, and that
the Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction..
What is the basis for the distinction between "ministerial" and
"discretionary" official acts? How do courts determine in which
class a particular official act belongs ? ·What are the legal consequences of the distinction? Upon what grounds or motives may
"discretionary" official action be predicated? The present discussion will be devoted to attacking some of these problems by the
methods of legal analysis. Public law problems have frequently
been attacked 'by comparative, historical and sociological methods;
more rarely by analytical methods.4
r. "Executive" and "Jiulicial" Acts. The term "ministerial" has
often been invoked to describe non-judicial acts generally. Thus,
4 E. g., BURGESS, CoMPARA'l'~ C0Ns'l'1Tu'l'10NAI.. LAW; GoonNow, CoMPARA'l'm .AI>Mrn1sTRATm LAw; GHos:e, CoMPARATm AnMrn1sTRATm LAw;

Ehrlich, "Comparative Public Law and the Fundamentals of its Study,
Cor.uMBIA L. REv. 623.
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in determining that a statute does not violate the '~separation of
powers" clause of the state constitution by conferring judicial pow~
ers upon non-judicial offi.cers,5 or that it does violate that clause
by imposing non-judicial duties upon courts,6 courts frequently
seek to sustain their decisions by naming the official acts called for
by the statute "ministerial acts." In other words, "ministerial" is
used as synonymous with "executive." This use of "ministerial"
is unfortunate, to say the least, but it may be rendered innocuous
by subdividing "ministerial" acts into those "purely ministerial"
and those "quasi-judicial."7 Such discrimination is not commonly
found, and this double use of "ministerial" has contributed to the
confusion of the courts. Thus, the case of Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 8 involving the question of separation of powers and the "definition" of "ministerial" therein attempted, has repeatedly been cited
in cases where the issue was whether a concededly executive (that
is, non-judicial) act was conclusive against attack in the courts.9
No court would deny that there are some non-judicial (and nonlegislative) acts which are "discretionary," as opposed to "ministerial," in the sense that they are conclusive against attack in the
courts j yet the double meaning of "ministerial" ("executive" and
5 Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. l6g ( 1861) ; State v. Le Clair, 86 Me.
522, 30 Atl. 7 (18g4).
6 See 7 CoI.UMBIA L. ruv. 003-5, for a discussion of this type of question.
7 Bruce, J. (rto'\V Professor Bruce of the University of Minnesota Law
School), in State ex rel. v. Stutsman, 24 N. D. 68, 139 N. W. 83 (1912),
at p. 88.
s Flournoy v. jef'fersonville (sttPra, n. s.) was a suit by a city to enforce
a special assessment for street improvements. D~fendant, a property owner,
urged that the statute under which the proceedings were had was void in
that it authorized the mayor; council and city clerk to issue a precept for
the amount of the assessmen,t, which was really the commencement of a
judicial action for the co11ection of the assessment. The question, then,
was whether the statute conferred judicial powers on non-judicial officers;
the court held that "the issuing of the wtit is a ministerial act and may be
performed by any person upon whom the la\v may cast the duty" (p. 172).
u Among the many subsequent cases in which this opinion is cited and
quoted from, may be mentioned :-State ex rel. v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612,
64 N. E. 558 (1902) (Mandamus to compel Governor to exercise his power
of appointing a Lieutenant-Governor); Stephens v. Jones, 24 S. D. 97, 123
N. W. 705 (1909) (Mamia11ms to compel county commissioners and county
superintendent of schools to consolidate school districts).
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"non-discretionary") appears to have led to a tendency, more perceptible in the cases a generation or two ago, to deny conclusiveness
to all non-judicial o~cial acts. It is not propose~ to discuss here
the meaning of "ministerial ac.t" as opposed to "judicial act," stricto
sensu.10
2. The Kind of Judicial Remedy Invoked.
The distinction
between "ministerial" and "discretionary" acts of non-judicial (and
non-legislative) officers, which is the particular point to be examined
'here, has been applied chiefly in cases invol~ing an ~.ttack by a private citizen upon the validity or conclusiveness of the act of such
an officer. \While it has been invoked most frequently where the
particular judicial remedy used has been mandamus, it is not confined to such cases. The distinction has been applied in actions for
damages against a public official for refusal to perform an act,11 or
for performing it negligently or improperly ;12 in suits to enjoin
official action claimed to be erroneous ;13 in certiorari proceedings
10 Some further examples of the confusion of terms are :-State v. Governor, 25 N. J. L. 331 (1856) (Mandamus denied, to compel Governor to
issue a commission to an elected officer; the court saying (p. 350) : "As
contra-distinguished from judicial duties, all duties are ministerial".) People ex rel. v. Jerome, 36 Misc. Rep~ 256, 73 N. Y. S. 3o6 (19m) ("The act
of every public official is either ministerial or judicial" (p. 257) ). Hamma
v. People, 42 Colo. 401, 94 Pac. 326 (1908) (defendant was committed for
contempt of court because he charged that a county judge had kept his accounts of fees and expenditures carelessly; held, not a judicial contempt,
since the keeping of accounts was a "ministerial," not a "judicial" act).
11 GooDNOW, PRINCIPLJU> OF ADMlNISTRAT~. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES',
pp. 295, 296; Grider v. Tally, 77 Afa. 422 (1884) (refusal of liquor license);
Downer v.•Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1856) (refusal of pilot's license), Kendall v.
Stokes, (U. S.) 3 How. 87, 11 L. Ed. 5o6 (1845) (removing credit from
books of Postmaster-General's department, placed there by predecessor).

12

Adams v. Schneider, (Ind. App. 1919) 124 N. E. 718, 4 MINNESOTA L.

REv. 303 (members of school board liable to spectator by falling of defective
stands at school athletic meet) ; People v. May, 251 Til. 54, 95 N. E. 999
(19u) (clerk of circuit court liable for carelessly accepting non-resident
surety on appea1 bond). See, however, McCord v. High, 24 Ia. 336 (1868);
Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904) holding officer liable
for exercise of a discretionary power.
13 Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. ·S. 1o6, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed.
894 (1904); I SPELLING INJUNCTION AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMltDil~S, (Ed. 2, 1901) §§ 6og-640, 22 CYc. 879 by Judge Henry Wade Rogers.
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to review the acts of non-judicial officers ;14 and even in rare cases
where the extraordinary remedy prohibition has been invoked.15
Moreover, the distinction is frequently invoked in collateral proceedings where the conclusiveness of an official act is involved;
as in qito warranto, 16 or in an action against a municipal corporation,17 or by such a corporation or the state. 18 Perhaps it has been
erroneously invoked in many of these cases; however, that cannot
be determined until the distinction has been defined or the principles upon which it rests made clear. Taking into account the great .
variety of cases in which the distinction has been resorted to, it
seems fair to say that it is, or is intended to be, one test of the
propriety, extent and method of control by judicial tribunals, stricto
sensu, over administrative (that is, non-judicial and non-legislative) 19 action, whether that control be direct or indirect, preventive
or punitive.
Is there any underlying conception which runs throughout these
cases and gives a rational unity to the entire conception? The
courts usually speak as if there were. The term "quasi-judicial"
is used so frequently in some connections (particularly in determining the scope of certiorari) in place of "discretionary" that it is not
always clear whether the courts are contrasting ,"ministerial" with
"discretionary" or with "quasi-judicial"; and undoubtedly there are
official acts which are "discretionary" in the sense that mandamits
will be refused, and yet are not "quasi-judicial" so that certiorari
will lie. 20 Moreover, it has been said that the United States Supreme
• 14 Drainage Commissioners v. Griffin, r34 IIL 330, 25 N. E. 995 (I890);
6 CYc. 752; Friedman v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 488 (r872).
1a State ex rel. v. Stutsman, supra, n. 7; Goodwin v. State, I45 Ala. 536,
40 So. r22 (r9Q6).
16 State v. Fidelity and Casua1ty Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 538, 4I N. W. rnS
(r888) (semble, insurance commissioner's license to foreign insurance company not conclusive as to its right to do business in the state; int~rpretation
of statute involved).
17 Rio Grande County v. Lewis, 28 Colo. 378, 65 Pac. SI (Igor).
1 s State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 74 AtL 392 (r909).
19 "Non-legislative", is not meant to exclude the exercise of powers of
a legislative character by officials not constituting a recognized legislative
body.
2o In re Saline County Subscription, Thompson et al. Petitioners, 45 Mo.
52 (r86g); People ex rel. Bartlett v. Dunne, 2!9 Ill. 346, 76 N. E. 570 (r9Q6).
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Court has treated the same act as "ministerial" in mandamus proceedings and "discretionary" in an action for damages ;21 but a
careful reading of the decision in question discloses that this opinion is not well founded,2 2 and it is opposed by several other cases
which have declared the test to be the same in the two classes of
cases.23 As a matter of policy, there may be excellent reasons for
holding that a public official may be coerced by mandamus, a preventive remedy, to do a particular act, and yet may not be sued for
damages, after the harm is done, for refusing to do the same act;
iJmt analytically. it would seem that both remedies postulate the
existence of a legal duty, to do or not to do the act in question, and
that to treat an act as "ministerial" in one proceeding and "discretionary" in another would deprive these phrases of all rational content as substantive concepts to be utilized and applied in reaching
conclusions in concrete cases, and would indicate that they are mere
labels to be placed upon conclusions already arrived at on other
grounds.

3. ''Ac:ts Involving the Exercise of Discretion or /itdgment."
Among the attempted definitions one often finds such statements as
these: "The duty is ministerial, when the law, exacting its discharge, prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion of its
21 GooDNOW, PRINCIPI,ES, p. 400.
22 In Kendall v. U. S. 12 Pet. 524, 9 L. Ed. n81 (1838), the court held
that the Postmaster-Gene~al could be compelled by 11ianda11ms to credit the
relators with the amount found due him by the Solicitor- of the Treasury
under a special Act of Congress; in Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How1 87, II L. Ed.
5o6 ( 1845), the court held the Postmaster-General was not liable in an
action for damages, brought by the relators in the previous case, for erroneously causing to be erased or suspended certain credits in favor of plaintiffs placed there by the defendant's predecessor jn office, the immunity
being based on the theory, that this was a "discretionary'' act. In another
count plaintiffs claimed damages for refusal to pay the claim after the
special act of Congress and the decision of the Solicitor of the Treasury
pursuant thereto, which was the same refusal involved in the 111a11da11ms
case. As to this count, the court confined ~tself to saying: that plaintiffs
could not have both 111a1ulamus and action for damages for the same wrong
(election of remedies). See 3 How. gg-103.
23 Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (1884) ; Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495
(1878). Contra:-Partridge v. General Council of Medical Education, 25
Q. B. D. 90 (1890).
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performance \vith such certainly that nothing remains for judgment or discretioh,''24 and "But where the act to be done involves
the exercise of discretion or judgment, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial."25
· Such statements would seem to postulate a class of official acts
in which the official is an automaton; the facts and the statute are
placed in the machine, a lever is pressed, and out comes the official
act. Such an official never was on land or sea. Human action
always involves the exercise of some judgment or discretion.
But, it may be said, "judgment'' or "discretion" means something
more than a mere mental operation; it involves intelligent choice
between two courses of action, where the decision is doubtful or
difficult of ascertainment. In short, the difference is merely one
of degree. This explanation, while inconsistent with the dogmatic
form in which the distinction is usually stated, may serve to point
to a class of clerical acts which are; "minis~erial", such as entering
figures in a book, 26 or copying a deed into the records. That is,
granted that the act is to be done, the details as to which the official
exercises judgment or discretion - the kind of pen he will use,
whether he will write in long-hand or with a typewriter - are such
tbat his choice does not affect individual interests, and in this sense
24 Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (1884), a leading case, wide1y quoted,
For similar statements, see WYMAN, ADMINlSTRA'.l'IVE LAw, § 34; People
ex rel. v. Rosendale, 5 Misc. Rep. 378, 379 ("A ministeria1 duty is one in
respect to which nothing is left to discretion; it is a simple definite duty
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.")
Wailes v. Smith, ComptroUer, 76 Md. 469, 477, 25 Atl. 922 (18g3) ("And
by 'ministerial' we mean where one is entrusted with the performance of an
absolute and imperative duty, the discharge of which requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment".); People v. Jerome, 36 Misc.
Rep. 256, 257, 73 N. Y. Supp. 3o6 (1901) ("A purely ministerial duty is one
to which nothing is left to discretion") ; Morton v. Comptroller General,
4 S. ,C. 430, 473, (1873); State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14, 74 Atl. 392 (1909).
2 5 A. L. Sanborn, "Mandamus", 26 CYc. 160; Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala.
422 (1884) 425; Wailes v. Smith, 76 Md. 4(59, 477, 25 Atl. 922 (18g3); People v. Jerome, 36 Misc. Rep. 256, 73 N. Y. Supp. 3o6 (1901); Friedman v.
Mathes, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 488, 502 (1872) (Certiorari to review tax assessments, "If an officer do an act depending on the exercise of the s1ightest
judgment or discretion on his part, then the act is judicial * * *") ; State
v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14, 74 Atl. 392 (rgog).
26 Kendall v. U. S., supra, n. 22.
0
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the "discretion involved" in doing such an act, is so unimportant
that it may be ignored.
But this reasoning will not solve very many actual controversies.
In most cases arising under mandanms, for instance, the issue is
whether the official will do the act, or not, at all. Assuming that the
official is honest and diligent, and eager to exercise properly the
statutory powers conferred on him, there still remains the exercise
of judgment and discretion in choosing the statute applicable, in
interpreting it, in ascertaining the facts in the particular case, and
in applying the statute to them. Rarely indeed will it happen that
these processes will not "involve", in a sztbstantia~ degree, the exercise of judgment and discretion. The recorder of deeds, for instance, when an instrument is presented for record, must interpret
the recording act, and likewise interpret the instrument, and apply
the statute to the particular facts; the sheriff in levying on personal
property must ascertain that the judgment debtor is the owner of it.
The "judgment and discretion" fovolved in either case is the same
as that which the judges exercise when the same questions are
brought before them; yet they hold. that the official acts "ministerially". Why? Is it not because tangible property rights are affected and the controversy assumes the aspect of private litigation,
the kind of questions the courts are constantly deciding, and which
they consider it their province to decide finally? In other words,
the courts regard it as a proper case for judicial control ?27
A slightly different definition is that given in Flournoy v. leffer- sonville,28 a statement frequently quoted :-"A ministerial act may,
perhaps, be defined to be one which a person performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of legal authority, without regard to,· or the exercise of, his own
judgment upon the propriety of the act being done."29
The first part of this definition is fairly descriptive of acts done
by subordinate employees in obedience to a specific command of a
2 7 In the case last cited the problem is attacked fundamentalJy, and when
the court says the act is ministerial, it appears to mean that judicial control
over such acts will not unduly invade the sphere of executive freedom.
2 s 17 Ind. l6g, 174 (186!).

2 9 Similar statements in 33 HARV. L. R.Ev. 465; State ex rel. v. Nash, 66
Ohio St. 6!2, 618, 64 N. E. 558 (1902).
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superior administrative official. Originally it seems that mandamus
was such a command from the King, as head of the administrative
system, to the royal subordinates, prescribing the thing to be done,
the command created the duty. 30 Perhaps the description is sufficiently accurate to designate official acts commanded by special
Acts of Congress, as in Kendall v. United States,31 where the statute
directed the Postmaster-General to credit the relaters, naming them,
with the amount ascertained and fixed by the Solicitor of the Trea.Sury-thus, in effect, for that purpose making the .Postmaster-General subordinate and subject to the orders of the Solicitor. However, for cases where the official acts under a statute, general in its
terms, which does not command any particular act or identify the
state of facts except in generic terms, and where the particular
command is to be issued, not by a superior administrative official
but by a court which has fallen heir to the vicarious prerogative
jurisdiction of the King's Bench in mandamus, it is unsound. Statutes are not and cannot be interpreted and applied automatically;·
the legislature does not and normally cannot command a particular
act. Now it is the courts whiCh issue the specific command; and
they are able the more readily to disguise from themselves the fact
that they are doing so by means of the nineteenth century illusion
that statutory interpretation was a mechanical process.32
,
The word "propriety" has a convenient ambiguity which veils the
latter part of the above quotation. "Propriety of the act being done"
may include the "propriety" of carrying out the legislature's policy
as expressed in the statute conferring the official powers. \i\There
the official acts or refuses to act in manifest disregard of the policy expressed in the statute, a proper case for judicial control is
usually presented. This control is usually justified on. the ground
that the case is one of "arbitrary and illegal" exercise of discretion,
or "abuse of discretion" ;33 sometimes, however, on the ground that
so GoonNOW, PRINCIPLES, pp. 42I, and 422, n. 4; HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY
LEGAL REMEDIES, (Ed. 3) § 2; SPELLING, INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY L~AL Rln.rEDIES, § I365; MERRILL, MANDAMUS, 52.
31 SuPra,
32

n.

22.

.

GENY, METHODE n'INTERPRETATION E'.l' SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE Pos1TIF
(Ed. 2, I9I9) §§ 13, 26; POUND, "Courts and Legislation", in THE SCIENCE
OF LEGAL ME'J.'HOD, p. 200.
3 3 E. g. Reg. v. Boteler, 4 Best & S. 959 (I864) ; In re Gross' License,
16I Pa. 344, 29 Afl. 25 (I8g4).
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a "ministerial duty" exists to do the act.34 The real basis of judicial control in such cases is that the official has exercised his power
from improper motives, upon improper grounds; he has not even
attempted to apply the statutory norm governing his official action
to the case in hand. Examples are: Where the licensing board refuses an applicant a license to practice dentistry because he is a
graduate of a dental college which is a rival of the one with which
the members of the board are connected34 ; where an official empowered to :issue licenses on certain terms refuses to issue any licenses at all. 35 The emphasis is now shifted from some quality or
characteristic of the official act to the grounds or motives on which
the decision of the official, to do or not to do it, is based. If "propriety" has the meaning above suggested-propriety of the legislative policy-, if all official acts are "ministerial" which the official
performs without wilful disregard of the legislative policy, the
class of ministerial acts will be extended far beyond the limits laid
down by the actual decisions.
If "propriety of the act being done" means the propriety of doing the particular act in the particular case, including the doing
or not doing of it as well as the method of doing it, it may be noted
that officials are sometimes held liable in damages for the doing of
acts which they might have refused to do at all,36 or which they
could not have been judicially coerced into doing in a particular
way.37 Yet the nature of the "act" is not changed by the nature
of the proceeding.
3 4 E. g. Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners v. People ex rel.
Cooper, 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887).
3 5 See People v. Perry, Mayor, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 206 (1852), where,
however, the court does not refer to the act as "ministerial". In State v.
Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 64 N. E. 558 (r902), where the governor had refused
to exercise his power of appointing a lieutenant-governor, the court said he
was under a "ministerial duty" to appoint someone, though he had "discretion" in selecting the person to be appointed.
36 Adams v. Schneider, (Ind. App. 1919) 124 N. E. 718, 4 MINN. L. R.Ev.
303 (the court said the members of the school board acted "ministerially"
in having stands erected for a school athletic meet, though it seems clear
they wou1d have violated no statute in refusing to hold the meet at all).
31 In McCord v. High, 24 Ia. 336 (1868), the late Judge Dillon held a
road supervisor liable for diverting a stream of water from plaintiff's land
in the course of repairing a highway, though he conceded that the defendant
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Assuming, as we are here; that the official is not wilfully disregarding the legislative policy as expressed in the statute, then the
"propriety of the act being done," as just defined, involves the inte].1)retation of the statute, the ascertainment of the facts of the
particular case, and the application of the statute to the facts. Once
more we are led back to the illusion that these processes- are mechanical, that in performing a certain class of official acts, the official acts automatically. "wlthout regard to, or the exercise of, his
own judgment." No doubt in many instances the official goes
through these processes unconsciously and simultaneously, but nevertheless they go on. Recording a deed, for example, is one of the
simplest official acts having far-reaching consequence5 upon private
interests; yet even here, however routine the operation may be, the
official exercises judgment.
But even if we concede that the official does not exercise "judgment" in the routine cases, the same certainly cam1ot be said of the
abnormal cases in which litigation arises, in the course of which
the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts may be
come important. The court would hardly concede that its decision
of the very: questions which the official-the recorder of deeds, for
instance-has already passed upon, involves no judgment or discretion. Moreover, taking the definition literally, if the official
does in fact exercise his judgment in regard to the propriety of
the act being done, it is not ministerial; the definition becomes useless when most needed.
If it is meant that an act is "ministerial" when the official oiight
not to exercise his judgmen~ or discretion as to the propriety of the
(particular) act being done, we come back to the question whether
there is a class of acts-indeed, any act-which the official ought
to do without the exercise of his own judgment. One might assume that an administrative official ought to use his intelligence· in
performing his duties as much as a judge. It is believed the "definition" will not stand analysis, and that the repetition of such a
had "discretion" in improving the highway. Perhaps the mandamus decisions may be distinguished from the cases where the official is held liable
in damages, on the ground that the "duty" is different in the two cases.
See Pound, "Legal Rights," 26 INTERN. JouRN. oF E'l.'Hics, at pp. 94-95. In
the one case the duty is both affirmative (to do) and negative (not to do);
in the other, it is merely negative. Sed qiiaere?
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shibboleth can only serve to obscure the nature of the real questions involved. Attention will be called further on to certain glimmerings of sense in these definitions. 38
4. The Nature of the Interests Affected. It is believed that
much of the confusion in American administrative law is due to
the circumstance tha~, historically, two opposite cross-currents of
juristic and political tradition have come into play. In the first
place, the King's Bench, by reason of the fiction that the sovereign
sat in person as a member of the court, exercised the functions of a
·superior administrative tribunal39 through its writ of nzandamtts
(originally a conunand from a superior to an inferior administrative official) and to some extent through other extraordinary proceedings. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, it became settled
that the court could review only questions of law, as distinguished
from questions of fact or expediency; the latter were reviewed by
the Privy Council.40 The court's jurisdiction survived the abolition
of the Star Chamber.41 From this division of functions our American courts inherited the principle that courts will not overturn administrative decisions on questions of expediency.
The line between questions of law and questions of expediency
was no more distinct, in England, than the division between the respective functions of the two tribunals. In general, the Privy Council reviewed only those extraordinary cases which could not be ·settled by the common law courts by the application of the ordinary
principles of law.42 In short, the distinction was not conceptual,
but functional. It is not surprising, "then, that American courts,
in the absence of any complementary administrative appellate tribunal comparafile to the Privy Council (or to the Quarter Session;,
which later absorbed many of its functions) have had considerable
difficulty in giving a rational content to the concept, "discretionary
38 Infra,

sub-headings 12 'and 13.
GN£IS'l', HISTORY oF THE ENGI.ISH CONS'.l'I'.l'U'.l'ION (Ashworth's trans.,
1886) II, Ch. 48, especially pp. 364, 365, 368-370; GooDNOW, PRINCIPLES, p.
421. See also MAITLAND, CoNS'.l'I'tU'l'IONAI. Hzs'tORY oF ENGLAND, 13440 GoonNow, op. cit, p. 423; GN:e!S'l', op. cit, II, p. 218, p. 363.
41 16 Car. I, c. Io.
42 GNEIS'l', DAS ENGtISCHE VERFASSUNGS-UND VERWAI.'.l'UNGSGESCHlCH'l'E,
I (Geschichte und heutige Gestalt der Aemter in England) (1857), §§ 20,
39

0

2I, 30.
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act." And while the absence of any effective administrative appeal
has led American courts to extend their control over the administrative field of action further than the English courts did, yet it is
still true that the courts will generally refrain' from interfering with
administrative decisions involving merely questions with which
courts do not ordinarily deal-e. g., whether a particular individual
is a proper person to engage in the jewelry business,43 or whether
a corporation's plan of doing business is contrary to public policy. 44
Generally the courts have not interfered with the exercise of the
licensing power as a mode of police regulation.
The other current of tradition flows from a directly opposite
function. The common law courts came to be looked to as the
guardian of individual rights of person and property against oppressive administrative action. Here the courts were not using a
vicarious administrative jurisdiction derived from the crown, but
were invoking the Teutonic conception that the King rules under
God and the la\v-and the courts refused to renounce their jurisdiction to administer the law. This characteristic Mr. Dicey has
unduly exaggerated under the name of "the rule of law."45 It became paramount during the struggle between the courts and the
crown in the seventeenth century.46
The statute which abolished the Star Chamber serves as a guide
to the scope of the individual interests thus judicially protected.
They include the "lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods or chattels
of any of the subjects of this kingdom"47 and freedom of the physical· person.4 s. The courts have been much more willing to interfere with administrative action· which directly invades the tangible
property or the physical person of the individual, than where inSamuels v. Couzens, supra, n. I.
Lloyd v. Ramsay, supra, n. 2. The idea that the Secretary of State
and the Executive Council can decide this question without the aid of the
court is apparent throughout the opinion~
45 Drc;sY, THI~ LAW oF '.l'HF; CoNSTI'l'UTION, (Ed. 5), chap. IV.
46 POUND, THE SPIRI'l' oF 'tHE Co:MMON LAW, ch. 3.
47 16 Car. I; c. ro, sec. 5. The prohibition in this section extends only
to the King and the Privy Council ; but the preambie, referring to Magna
Charta, c. 29, and the prnciple of the act, lend color to judicial control over
all officials. GNF:IS't, Hrs'l'oRY II, 364 n.
4816 Car. I, c. ro, Sec. VIII, (relating to habeas corpits).
43

44
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tangible interests of substance or of personality are infringed. 49
Where individual interests of the former kind are involved, the
courts will not be balked of their jurisdiction because the official
may, for other purposes, be regarded as having "discretion." As
the late Judge Dillon said :-"The discretion which protects such an
officer as the road supervisor stops at the boundary where the absolute rights of property begin."50 A property lawyer might say that
the "absolute rights of property" end wher~ the official's "discretion" begins. The subjective nature of the concept "discretion"
becomes apparent. Mr. Justice Holmes reasons more intelligibly5 i"
in Miller v. H orton52 when he argues that the direct invasion of
physical property is a strong motive for interpreting the statute so
that no discretionary power is conferred.
On the other hand, where intangible interests of substance or of
personality are involved, such as that of engaging in a particular
vocation, courts have been much more willing to concede the existence of a "discretionary power" to make decisions which will be
conclusive against judicial attack. The cases of judicial attack on
the exercise of the licensing power illustrate this tendency. 58 Thus,
in Samuels v. Cottzens,54 administrative action which virtually deprived an individual of his interest of substance in the pursuit of a
lawful calling (engaging in the jewelry business) was held con49 It is true that the broader term "liberties" is used in Magna Charta,
c. 29; and Coke interpreted this as inc1uding freedom to engage in a business or vocation. SECOND !NSTI'l'U'l'E, I (1792), 47.
5 0 McCord v. High, 24 Ia. 336, 350; see sztpra, n. 38. See Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904) : "The discretion in which such
officers are protected must be limited to the line where their acts invade
the private property rights of another." ,
5 1 Judge Dillon, in McCord v. High, szepra, argued that the absence of
other redress was a reason why the property owner should be allowed to
sue the official, thus introducing the argument ab inconvenienti.
52 152 .Mass, 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891).
113 See HIGH, Ex'l'RAORDINARY LEGAL R$:MEDIES (Ed. 3, 1896), § 327; 31
YAI.~ L. ]OUR. 354- Cf. McCord v. High, sztpra, n. 38, where the official was
held liable for an erroneous physical invasion of a tangible property right,
with Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Ia. 244 108 N. W. 3n (1906), where
officials were held not liable for mere1y orderiiig plaintiff, erroneously, to
remain in 9.uarantine, without putting any direct physical compulsion on his
person.
,
54 S1'pra, n. 1.
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clusive5 s against attack by mandamus. Especially is this apt to be
true where the liberty or privilege curtailed is one which the legislature might constitutionally prohibit entirely. Thus, in Lloyd v.
Ranisay 56 the court took as its starting point the premise that the
legislature could grant or refuse corporate charters as it saw fit;
there was no inalienable right to incorporate. A fortiori, then, the
- legislature can impose any restrictions it may see fit, including the
approval of an administrative official. This vicious argument a fortiori has been invoked time and again, sometimes to sustain arbi·trary administrative action. 57 It is submitted, then, that the nature
of the individual interest involved and of the method in which it
is infringed by administrative action, is often a decisive factor in
determining whether the courts will call the official act "ministerial"
or "discretionary" for purposes of judicial control.
5. Importance of the Official. While it is often said that the
ministerial or discretionary character of the official act is to be determined with reference to the particula11 act to be done in the particular case rather than to the ~mportance of the official's "duties"
in general,58 nevertheless courts are in varyint degrees influenced
by the importance or prominence of the office. Aside from the
holdings that mandamus will not lie against a chief executive/ 9
other cases nave emphasized the importance of the office as a potent
factor in determining whether the "duty" is ministerial -or discretionary. ·Thus, in State es rel. v. Sti~tsmmi, 60 Bruce, J., pointed
55 The court found that the discretion was exercised "reasonably."
so Supra, n. 2.
s1 See HENDERSON, TH£ PosrrroN oF FoimIGN CoRPORA'l'IONS IN AMER-

ICAN CoNS'l'I'l'U'J.'IONAI. LAW, passim, especially Chapter VI.
5S.See GooDNOW, PRINCIPI.£5, p. 401.
59 GooDNOW, op. cit., p. 435; 3 CoRNEI.I. L. QuAR'l'. 3o8; State v. Governor, 25 N. J. L. 331 (1856). In other cases, refusal to mandamus the
chief executive is based largely on the discretion of the court to refuse to
issue the writ, such discretion being affected by the doctrine of separation
of powers.
60 24 N. D. 68, 139 N. W. 83, at p. 89 (1912). See also State Publishing
C<>-.; v. Smith, 23 Mont. 44, 57 Pac. 449 (1899) (approval of state printing
contract by governor and state treasurer) ; Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.
S. 627, 34 Sup. Ct. 938 (1914) (suit to enjoin Secretary of Treasury from
lowering duty on sugar); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (1827) (conclusiveness of President's determination that imminent danger of invasion
exists, before calling out the militia).
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out the difference between the approval of a 'bond by a· clerk of a
court and the approval of a bond by the Board of Railroad Commissioners. A little further on the court says :-"For good faith
in such matters they are responsible to the public, and not to the
sureties." 61
The prominence of the office, _if it be an elective one, is important
in determining the probability of effective control by the electorate.
The judiciary is only one agency of several which can exercise control over administrative action, 62 and in determining whether or not
it will exercise control in a particular case, the court may, not improperly, consider the probability of other method& of control being
effective. However, the prominence or pettiness of the official does
not characterize the act; the approval of a bond by a clerk is the
same kind of official act as the approval of a bond by a state railroad
comm1ss10n. The differences between the two, for purposes of
judicial control, rest upon grounds of pure expediency, which are
often concealed beneath the words "ministerial" and "discretionary."
6. Investigation or Deterniination of Facts. Does the circumstance that the official must investigate and reach a conclusion as
to the existence of facts before doing the official act make it a "discretionary" act? One would hardly .think so, since the official does
not live in a vacuum, ~s not completely walled in by the pages of a
statute book; and must inevitably ascertain the existence of some
facts in order to perform the simplest official act. Accordingly, it
is commonly said :-"That a necessity may exist for th~ ascertainment, from personal knowledge or by information derived frolll
other sources, of the state of facts on which the performance of the
act becomes a clear and specific duty, does not operate to convertit
61 139 N. W. 91.
See a1so State Publishing Co. v. Smith, supra, n. 6o,
where it is said that the governor and treasurer are responsible to the people
alone. "It is not for the court to correct their consciences." The possibility of control by non-judicial agencies is strongly emphasized.
62 MA'r°Hl~WS, PRINCIPLl>S OF STA'.l'E ADMINISTRATION, p. 9, enumerates
five forms of control over administrative action: "Popular, political, legislative, judicial, and administrative." See also GoonNow, PRINCIPLES, 370
ad fiit.
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into an act judicial in ·its nature. Such is not the judgment or discretion, which is an essential element of judicial action." 63
•
This negative form of statement has led to an affirmative form,
the converse of the foregoing, which if logically applied would unduly widen the scope of judicial control :-"That the duty is ministerial when it is to be performed upon a certain state of facts,
although the officer or body must judge according to their best ability whether the facts exist, and whether they should perform the
act, seems to be the rule established by the weight of authority;
otherwise, it is obvious that no mandamus could ever lie in any case
against public officers."~ 4 ·
On the other hand, it is said :-"If the duty is one that necessarily involves an inquiry of fact and an exercise of judgme-nt upon
the case presented it is not ministerial, and the disposition made of
it will be binding on the courts." 65
Inasmuch as every official act must be preceded by the ascertainment of some fact by the official, and "involves" the exercise of
some judgment (unless "judgment" means an exceptional degree
of intelligence, though the matter is not usually put as a question
of degree), obviously this statement offers no criterion.
One of the most unlearned yet enlightening opinions on this subject which the writer has seen is that in Morton v. Coniptroller General,66 an application for a mandamus to compel the defendant,
comptroller, to levy a tax to pay the interest on state bonds. In
granting the writ, the court said:63 Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (1884), at p. 426; quoted with approva'l,
GoonNow, PRINCIPLO:S, p. 405; People v. May, 251 Ill. 54. 57, 95 N. E. 999
(19n), and in many other cases. "The ascertainment of a fact which raises
the' duty, or is collateral to its performance, is not such an exercise of
judgment as will deprive the duty of its ministerial character." State v.
Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 14 Atl. 392- (1go8), citing Grider v. Tally.
64 Stephens v. Jones, 24 S. D. 97, 102, 123 N. W. 705 (1909) (county
commissioners and county superintendent decided a "majority of the qualified electors" had not signed a petition for consolidation of school districts;
·mandamus issued, the court having decided to the contrary).
65 State v: Howard, 83 Vt. 6, at p. 14, 74 At'l. 392 (1908) (allowance
of claims for trayeling expenses of official by state auditor, conclusive in
action by state to recover back the '~sums" paid). See also Wailes v. Smith,
76 Md. 469, 25 Atl. 922 (1893).
66 4 s. c. 430 (1873).
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"The fact that a reasonable doubt exists as to some necessary
fact on which the duty of performance depends does not interfere
with the certainty of the duty where the ascertainment of such fact
is the proper subject of jwlicial inquiry, for in that case the officer,
if doubtful as to the fa<:t, may put the party demanding performance to proof of such fact in a proper judicial proceeding, as in
mandamus . . . where, as is sometimes· the case, a public officer
or a public body is clothed with power to determine conclusively
the existence of any fact as bearing on the performance of a public
duty, a discretion on the part of the officer may exist interfering
with the certainty of the duty demanded, so that a court might not
be justified in treating such fact as a matter for judicial entertainment, when the remedy seeks to enforce specifically such a duty." 67
The naive suggestion that official action can wiit until the salutary
judicial remedy has dissipated the official doubt, may be passed
over. The engaging candor of the court in stating thaf an official
has discretion because his determination of fact is conclusive, rather
than the reverse, that his determination of fact is conclusive because he has discretion, reminds one of the small boy, in the fable
about the magic garment which only the virtuous could see, who
cried out that the king had nothing on.
Since most offices in America today are created and regulated
by written law, constitutional or statutory, the written law may
provide or indicate whether or not the official's determination of
facts is to be conclusive against all or some forms of judicial attack. To this extent the exercise and extent of exercise of judicial
control over the administration will (assuming the statute to be
constitutional) be settled by the legislature- and the courts have
merely to obey. Where, as is usually the case, the legislature,
which is more apt to thfok of the interests of society than of individual interests,68 fails to indicate clearly the effect to be given to
administrative decisions of fact when judicially questioned, the
courts must determine this effect by reference to a wide variety
of factors.
'
Where the statute empowers the official to administer oaths and
4 S. C. 474. The italics are the present writer's.
Freund, "Interpretation of Statutes," 65 UNIV. OF PA. L.
p. 215 (1917).
67

68

ruv. 207,

at
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take evidence on certain issues of fact, the official determination of
fact is more apt to be treated as conclusive than where no such procedural details are prescribed, not only because this indicates a legislative intent to confer discretionary power, but also be~ause the
"due process" requirement is in many cases met by such provisions.68 •
Where the statute enumerates the facts on which official action is
to be predicated, the courts will frequently call such facts "jurisdictional" and hold the official's determination of such facts not
conclusive on judicial attack. 69 Where the official's determination
of fact is wholly subject to judicial review, (as in the nµisance
cases) he really has no "jurisdiction" in the proper sense of the
term and it seems useless to call the facts "jurisdiCtional."
7. Acts Involving the Interpretation of Statu.tes. The powers·
and functions of American administrative officials are, in theory at
least, enumerated and defined in statutes; there are no unenumerated or residuary administrative powers.70 In order to perform
most, if not all, of his official acts, the official must, therefore, have
recourse to and interpret the statute or statutes which purport to
constitute the breath of his official being. Perhaps the "interpretation" may be so simple as to be scarcely the result of conscious
thought; or perhaps it may require a high degree of intelligence.
At all events, every official act, broadly speaking, "involves" the
interpretation of a statute (or, a constitutional provision), and
therefore that an official act "involves" the interpretation of a statute or even of ·several statutes would seem to be no ground for
_ classifying it as "discretionary." Such is the view generally accepted. Thus, it is said :-"A decision which rests solely upon the
G&• North German Lloyd, etc., Co. v. Hedden, 43 Fed. 17 (18go); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central .R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 30
Sup. Ct. 155 -(1909); Provident Saving Life Assur. Soc. v. Cutting, 181
Mass. ·261, 63 N. E. 433 (1902).
Go Holmes, J., in Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540 (1891) (action for
killing sound horse under statute authorizing "killing of horse infected with
farcy or glanders; held, that the officials had jurisdiction to kill only horses
actually-i. e., found by the court-so infected). Hutton v. Camden, 39
N. J. L. 122 (1876) (abatement of nuisance; existence of nuisance, judicially found, was "jurisdictional") ; People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of
Health, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893).
1<> MA'l'Hr:ws, ·op. cit., pp. 10, 12; FREUND, 9 PoL. SCL QuAR. 413; GHosr:,
CoMPARA'l'IVr: ADMINIS'l'RA'l'IVr: LAW (1919), p. 256.
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construction of a statute does not involve the exercise of j_udgment
which the law contemplates." 71 For mandamus cases the following statement is typical :-"Where the duty is such as necessarily
requires the examination of evidence and the decision of questions
of law and fact, such a duty is not ministerial; but an act is none
the less ministerial because the person performing it may have to
satisfy himself that the state of facts exists under which it is his
right and duty to perform the act, and although in so doing he must
to such extent construe a statute by which the duty is imposed."72
The statement is so self-contradictory as to be meaningless. No
doubt it represents an -attempt to r~concile the cases which have
held the official interpretation of the statute to be conclusive, with
those where it has been held clearly not. The latter are more numerous. For instance, even where the statute expressly called for
the construction of a statute by the attorney-general, it was held
that his act was "ministerial." 73
The process called "interpretation" usually is more complex than
the word indicates; it involves the application of the statute, filling
in gaps, and even choosing the statute to be applied; it is therefore frequently so bound up with the official act itself that to review the one would be to deny conclusiveness to the other.
The United States Supreme Court has on several occasions held
that it will not overturn the interpretation of a statute by an executive official.74 In other cases it has denied conclusiveness to the
State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, at p. 14, 74 At!. 392.
A. L. Sanborn in 26 CYc. 161, quot~ in Stephens v. Jones, 24
S. D., at p. 102. Similar statements occur in a number of other cases.
7 3 People ex. rel. v. Rosendale, 5 Misc. Rep. 378, 25 N. Y. Supp. 76g.
( 1893). See also State ex rel. Jones v. Cook, 174 Mo. 100, 73 S. W. 489
(1903) (secretary of state's refusal to issue certificate to private bankers,
based ~n erroneous interpretation of statutes; mandamus granted).
74 Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (1840) ("A resolution of Congress,
requiring the exercise of so much judgment_ and investigation, can, with no
propriety, be said to command a mere ministerial act to be done by the
secretary"); U. S. v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 48 (1888); U. S. ex rel. Riverside
Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 6g8. See also Wailes v.
Smith, Comptroller, 76 Md. 46g, 25 Atl. 922; American Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Fy1er, 6o Conn. 448, 22 Atl. 494 (1891) ("The construction of a statute is
not a ministerial act").
11

12 Judge
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official's interpretation.75 In Roberts v. U. S.,76 Peckham, J., distinguislied U. S. v. Black,11 a very similar case, by saying that in
the latter case the official act involved the interpretation of two
statutes, in the former, only one. Absurd as this distinction may
seem at a glance, it is not necessarily absurd if it represents an
arbitrary line between two conflicting principles which shade off
into one another by insensible degrees. However, it is believed
there are no such principles. On the contrary. it would seem that
the interpretation of two statutes, being a more difficult task, would
be a clearer case for judicial interference than the interpretation
of one. The more doubtful it is whether the official is right, the less
chance there is of correcting his mistakes. 78 Summa jus, sttninia
injuria.
8. "Ministerial Duties" and "Discretionary Duties." Instead of
"ministerial acts" and "discretionary acts", the distinction is often
drawn between "ministerial, ·duties" and "discretionary duties".
Thus, Professor Goodnow says:-"As opposed to the ministerial
or mandatory duties are the discretionary or judicial duties." 79
How can one speak of a "discretionary duty"? On its face the
expression is a contradiction in terms, for one cannot be under a
duty to perform an act, or to refrain from performing it, if he has
a discretion, i. e. a choice, as to whether or not he will perform it.
A closer an~.lysis will disclose that tl{e contradiction in terms is due
to the use of "discretion" and "duty" in different senses.
(a) In the first place, "duty" has a narrow and a broad meaning. One speaks of the "duties" of a public official, meaning his
functions as such. Thus, it is the "duty" of the President to call out
the militia in time of invasion, it is the "duty" of the prosecuting attorney to institute criminal proceedings against violators of the
laws, and it is the "duty" of the recorder of deeds to file or record
conveyances of real estate. In these cases we are not thinking of
7 5 Roberts v. U. S., 176 U. S. 221, 230 (1899); American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94. 23 Sup. Ct. 33 (1902).
76 176 U. S. 221, at p. 230.
77 Supra, n. 74.
'is This line of reasoning is neatly brought out in State ex rel. v'. Governor, 25 N. J. L. 331, at p. 350.
79 GooDNOW, PRINCIPLIIS, p. 2g6. The same terminology is found in
many of the above quotations :,ind in many other cases.
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specific redress through judicial process, for the violation of the
"duty." The word does connot,_ loosely, the idea of obligation;
but the obligation may be one which can be enforced only through
some non-judicial agency, if at all. Thus, in the two examples first
named-the President and the prosecuting attorney-no judicial
remedy would be available for a breach of the duty. The legislature might impeach the official, the electorate might repudiate him
or his party at the polls, public opinion might bring pressure to
bear upon him; or, in other cases, the official might be removable
by a higher administrative authority. Professor Goodnow calls
these latter "moral duties." 80 This terminology seems inaccurate;
since "moral duties" are generally those for which there is no governmental sanction at all; whereas here there is a definite sanction
operating not alone through the force of unorganized public opinion
but also through such definite and organized governmental organs
as the electorate, the legislature, and removing officials.
In another sense, "duty" means obligation, a violation of which
is followed by redress through judicial action. If the dominant
theory of the nature of law-rules laid down by the courts for the
determination of legal rights and duties 81-is accepted, then only
these latter duties are "legal duties." Since it is conceded that
courts will not interfere where the "duties" are "discretionary," it
follows that these "duties" are not legal duties at all and ought
not to be called by that name where the object of the discussion is
to determine whether or not the courts will review official action. 82
(b) The word "discretionary" has a double meaning here, too.
In a sense, all duties, even legal duties, are "discretionary" in that
the subject of the duty has the power to violate the duty. Thus,
if a health official is under a legal duty not to destroy innocuous
property, he may actually destroy it nevertheless.83 In this sense
GooDNOW, op. cit., pp. 297, 299. .
s:i.GRAY, Tm~ NATURS AND SouRC:SS oF TH£ LAW, Chap. IV. The element of judicial enforcement was not insisted upon by the earlier analytical
jurists. HoLI,AND, ]URISPRUDENCS (Ed. IO), p. 40; AUSTIN, ]URISPRUDENCS
(Ed. 4), Lecture r.
s2 Professor Goodnow was discussing other means of control over official action in addition to the judiciary, and hence his use of "discretionary
duties" is not so objectionable.
83 Of course, he may be enjoined from destroying it, or be prevented
by the owner's exercise of self-help, or be physica1ly unable to get at it.
80
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he has "discretion". But he has no privilege of destroying the innocuous property, nor is he immune from action at the suit of the
individual injured. In this sense, then, he has no "discretion"; and
this is the sense in which "discretion" is used in those cases where
the official action is directly attacked, as by injunction, mandaniies,
·or action for damages. Bence, the term "discretionary duties" is,
for purposes of judicial reasoning, a misnomer.
9. Legal Conseqitences. of the Official Act. In a few instances
an effort has been made to throw light on the nature of the official
act by analyzing the legal consequences attending its performance
or non-performance. Thus, in People e.x rel. Schwab v. Grant, 84
cited and relied on in Sanmels v. Couzens, 85 where a statute provided that· "the mayor shall have authority to grant licenses" to
auctioneers, the court said :-"A power to grant a privilege to one
is inconsistent with the possession on the part of another of an
absolute right to exercis.e such privilege. The requirement that a
person must secure leave from someone to entitle him to exercise
a right, carries. with it, by natural implication, a discretion on the
part of the other to refuse to grant it, if in his judgment, it is improper or unwise to give the ~equi~ed consent." 86
The reasoning here is : The mayor has a power87 to grant a license; therefore he has power to refuse a license; therefore he has
a privilege (absence of duty) to refuse a license, and (or). an immunity from mandamus suit for such refusal. The reasoning is a
petitio princ.ipii, for .the very point to be determined is whether or
not he has such a privilege or immunity. One could as well argue
that because a recorder of deeds has a power to record a deed
(thereby affecting the rights of claimants to the property described
in the deed), therefore he has a power to refuse to record the deed
84

85

126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. 954 (1891).
Supra, n. I. The reasoning in this extract is about all that the court

gives by way of explaining its decision.
- 8a 126 N. Y., at p. 481.
s7 The terminology here is based on Pound, "Legal Rights," z6 !N'.r~N.
J OUR. OF ETHICS 92; BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, I, I, § 139; Hohfeld, "Some
Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning," 23 YALE L.
]OUR. 16; Corbin, "Legal Analysis and Terminology," 29 ibid. 163. The
writer is not, however, prepared to accept the Hohfeldian scheme of "jural
opposites" and "jural correlatives."
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(he undoubtedly has such a naked power, though it may result in a
breach of duty), therefore he has a privilege of refusing, a proposition which by no means follows: The danger of attempting to solve
the problem purely by legal analysis is apparent. Legal analysis
never solves problems; it merely clarifies thought and clears the
ground for a discussion of the real issue involved. 88
A similar attempt to define "ministerial duty" in terms of legal
consequences is found in M ort01i v. •Comptroller General&fl :-"A
duty is ministerial when an individual has such a legal interest in
its performance that neglect of performance becomes a wrong to
such individual."
While this gives no answer to the crucial question whether the
particular neglect which harms some individual interest is a legal
wrong, i. e. a breach of a judicially enforceable duty owed to a private individual, it does indicate that the duty in question is one
owed to a private individual as distinguished from one owed to the
state. In England the writ of mandamus was issued in the name
of the King, the private individual being merely a relator; and the
duty sought to be enforced was conceived of as a duty to the
Crown-what. Austin calls an "absolute duty". 00 This distinction,
it seems, is still maintained in England, where there is a "writ of
mandamus", corresponding to the ancient writ, and an "action of
mandamus" which is purely a proceeding for the breach of a duty
owed to an individual as such.01 In most jurisdictions in' this country, mandamus is treated as a civil action for the breach of a duty
owed to an individual, i. e., a "relative duty." The shifting of emphasis has not always been perceived, as is shown by the use of
such loose phrases as "discretionary duties."
Analytically, then, the problem of distinguishing between ministerial and discretionary acts resolves itself into determining the
existence or non-existence of such a relative legal duty. Ordinarily,
a court will inquire into all the facts and circumstances, and determine for itself whether the defendant was unqer a legal duty to
the plaintiff, and if so, whether or not it was violated; the court's
ss Corbin, op. cit., 29 Y,u,-s L. JoUR. 237.
so 4 S. C. 430, at p. 474oo Aus'l'IN, JURISPRUDENCE (Ed. 4), Lecture 17; POUND,
cit., p. 9491 ODG!lRS, THE COMMON LAW oF ENGLAND (Ed. 10 of BROOM'S Co:r.i::MENTARIES, 19n), II, II42-3, n63-6. See a1so SPEI.LIN<?> op. cit.,§ 1363.
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investigation will not be precluded or· even, for most purposes,
affected by the circumstance that the defendant has decided that
he was under no such duty. If officials were uniformly held to
answer in judicial proceedings as individuals are, were uniformly
subjected to what Mr. Dicey calls "the rule of law," all official acts
would be "ministerial." But it is just here that the official differs
from the private citizen. The official may have the power, by
deciding or acting in certain ways or under some circumstances, of
creating in himself a privilege (absence of duty) of acting or not
acting so as to affect injuriously individual interests, even though
a court might later think he made a mistake; and of creating an
im~unity against judical investigation to determine if he did make
a mistake.
The official may have the power to affect the legal rights, duties,
privileges or immunities of the individual, to others than the official,
as in the case of a licensing official92 or_ a recorder of deeds (p_erhaps), by his refusal to act; or he may not have such a power, as
in the case of a sheriff selling a third person's property on execution (the sale being void because the sheriff has no power to transfer title). It is not the presence or absence of this power which
enables one t6 class the official act as ministerial or discretionary,
92 A licensing official has the power of depriving (by refusal) an applicant of a privilege or immunity against criminal prosecution, and thus the
denial produces legal consequences, even though the official was, for some
, purposes, acting "ministerially." 'I'hus, it is generally held that the circumstance that an applicant for a license might have compelled its issuance by
mandamus or have maintained an action against the official for the damage
caused by its refusal, is no defense to a prosecution for engaging in the
particular vocation without a license. State v. Myers, 63 Mo. 324 (1876)
(broker's tax license); New York v. 503 Fifth Avenue Co., 90 Misc. 277,
r53 N- y_ Supp. 7 (1915) (sign license); Armour & Co. v. Comm., IIS Va.
312, 79 S. E. 328 (1913) (merchant's tax license); State v. Stevens, 78 N.
H .. 268, 99 Att:723 (1916) (lightning-rod agent's license); State v. Doerring, 194 Mo. 3g8, 415, 92 S. W. 489 (1905) (dentist's license); People v.
Ratledge, 172 Cal. 401, 156 Pac. 455 (1916) (chiropractor's license); 23
Cvc. ·I20 (n. 70, citing many other cases) and 15 R. C. L. 392, as to 1iquor
licenses. But see Royall v. Virginia, n6 U. S. 572, 6 Sup. Ct. 510 (1886)
(lawyer's tax license; the license is a mere receipt for the tax); State v.
Cooper, II Ida. 219, 81 Pac. 374 (1905) (physician's license).. In all these
cases except the last two the court apparently assumed that the issuance of
the license would have been "ministerial" in a mandamus suit.
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but the presence or absence of the power in the official to create a
privilege and (or) an immunity in himself, by his own decision or
action, in relation to the individual whose interests are affected.
This latter kind of official power may, in order tO preserve the traditional terminology, be called "discretionary official power." The
term "discretionary power" is coming more and more to be used in
place of "discretionary act"-e. g., in the two cases cited at the
beginning of this article..
This is only a way of stating the problem, analytically. The courts
have still to determine whet~er, under the circumstances of the particular case, this discretionary power exists. Where no individual
interests are affected by the act of the official, no question of discretionary power arises; this follows from the limitation of the
concept to judicial proceedings brought to protect or vindicate individual interests. The official's duty to the state, whether judicially
enforceable or othenvise enforceable, is not taken into account.
Only by narrowing the concept can it be made useful.
From the preceding discussion, one might infer that the courts
have no law on the subject of discretionary powers, that each case
is decided subjectively, and the result is not predicable. Certainly
there is a basis for such pessimism. In many of the cases in mandanms, for instance, the court seems to reach its conclusions on
grounds of policy and then attempts to "rationalize"03 this conclusion
by some shibboleth, such as those above quoted. 94 One may even
be led to assume that the courts veer toward interference or noninterference in time-cycles,0 " and that "administrative law," if there
be such a thing, is a purely negative concept.06 It is believed, however, that this overstates the case. To the present writer it seems
that, with the increasing willingness of courts to recognize administrative agencies as coordinate and independent governmental organs,
the problem of judicial control resolves itself more and more into
a problem of statutory interpretation. And while legislative draftos Professor JA'M~S HARVEY ROBINSON, in "TH~ MIND IN TH~ MAKING"
(I92I), p. 40, has an interesting discussion of this type of thinking.
94 Siepra, under subdivisions -3, 6, 7, and 8.
os Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 30 YAL~ L.
JoUR. 781, especially p. 7if>, n. 55.
96 Ibid., p. 783.
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ing is rudimentary ·(particularly so in regard to administrative provisions) and judicial notions of interpretation are elemental, yet
certain factors may be predicated as having, shall we say, "more
or less to do" with the result. It is now proposed to expose summarily some of these factors.
10. Policy or Purpose of the Legislation. Functionally, the problem of discretionary power has been stated thus: "The best service
administraj:ive law can perform in this particular field (individual
·rights) is : (I) First, to see that the administration is not allowed
to make its own laws, be judge of its own cause and execute its
own _de~rees except where these may be absolutely necessary. It
must, in other words, discriminate (1) between cases where the
administration must take the law from the legislature direct and
others where, owing to the speciai.information at its [the adminis~rative agency's] command, the legislature must be content to leave
it to the administration to work out in detail the principles which
alone the former is in a position to prescribe by statute; (2)
between cases where the rule of law can and should be framed in
unconditional fanguage (in which case its enforcement must, as a
rule, be left to the law' courts), and cases where that is not possible
(in which case, necessarily, the administr~tion must be given power
to exercise a quasi-judicial juri~diction); and (3) between cases
where public interests will not suffer if the administration was ·(sic)
to appeal ·to the law courts for the enforcement of its orders and
others where they must suffer irreparable injury if the a"dministration were left to enforce them through the litigious procedure of
the law courts."97
This states __ the legislature's problem as well as the court's problem. The court's problem is to ascertain the policy an.d purpose of the
statute and the means adopted for giving effect to that policy, in
order to decide whether or not the official empowered to act is given
discretionary power in reference to a given decision or act. Thus,
in Lloyd v. Ramsay,mi the court said: "We cannot be unmindful
97
98

GROSE, CoMPARA'l'IVE ADMlNlS'l'RA'l'IVE LAW (Calcutta, 1918), p. 588.
183 N. W., at p. 338. Tpe reference to other statutes is an interest-

ing departure from the traditiona'l common-law view that statutes do not
declare principles but merely make rules for exceptional cases. In Roman
law, principles were derived from statutes as well as from the traditional
juristic materials. See Dig. I, 3, 12, 18, and 26-28.
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of the history of the times in which we live nor can we shut our
eyes to the declared policy of the state,.not only by this, but by other
statutes, to bring corporations organized under the laws of the state
of Iowa under the.direct investigation of a competent tribunal, so
that corporations \vhose methods of business may be against public
policy or 'otherwise objectionable' shall not be permitted to organize
and do business in this state."
Again, in People e~ rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board of Dental Ezaminers9° the court discusses the policy of the statute regulating the practice of dentistry, and concludes that, to effectuate the
purpose of the act, the board had discretionary power in determining what was a "reputable college,'' although the statute was mandatory in its langilage. In People ez rel. Schwab v. Grant100 the
court reviewed the history of the regulation of auctioneers, and
concluded that the purpose of the particular statute was to limit
the mmiber of auctioneers and that the mayor had discretionary
power in determining that number. On the other hand, in People
ez rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Commission,101
the same court concluded the object of the statute as to licensing
race-tracks was not to allow the commission to limit the number or
to restrict competition, but to insure honest and "proper" races.
Examples of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely.
On the other hand, some courts shy at this type of reasoning. In
Samuels v. Couzens there is not a word as to the object of the ordinance, except that it is a regulatory license and not a taxing license.
This conclusion is reached by adverting to the smallness of the fee
exacted for the license. The licensing power is usually con£erred
with one of three objects in view: regulation, revenue, or registra~
tion. Sometimes it is a combination of two or all three of these
objects. Where the object is to raise revenue (as in the case of
many municipal license taxes102 ) or for mere registration ( e. g.,
automobile licenses, in many instances), the official has generally no,
or a narrowly limited, discretionary power. Where the object is
99 IIO III. 18o (1884).
1" 0 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N. E. g64 (1891~.
101190 N. Y. 31, 82 N. E. 723 (1907).
102 See State v. Myers, szipra, n. 92; Armour & Co. v. Comm., ibid.;
Royall v. Virginia, ibid.
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regulation,1<> 3 the official is generally, but not universally,1 64 conceded to have discretionary power within some limits and the controversy usually raises the question whether he has acted within
those limits in acting as he did upon particular grounds and with
reference to particular facts. To determine these limits, resort may
be had by the court to the particular policy or object of the statute,
as in Lloyd v. Ramsay/00 People ex rel Schwab v. Grant,106 and
many other cases. On the other hand, it seems unsatisfactory to
solve a particular problem, as in Samuels v. Couzens, by merely
saying that the official had discretionary power, without a more
exact analysis to determine whether the particular official act falls
within the limits of that power. The distinction often made betwe_en
"absence of discretion" and "abuse of discretion" is not of much
. practical importance in deciding particular controversies.
To allow the court to determine the policy or purpose of the
statute involves certain dangers. At best, it introduces an element
of uncertainty which can never be wholly avoided, no matter how
carefully a statute is framed.107 At worst, it gives the individual
judge an opportunity to give vent to his hostility toward governmental encroachments on the sphere of individual liberty, which
has made much of our voluminous legislation ineffective in operation. Furthermore, the legislature frequently leaves the policy of
legislation indefinite, and the court must resort to extrinsic sources
to determine the precise scope of the regulation.
II. "Mandatory" or "Pernvissive" Language of the Statute. It
is frequently said that the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts is the same as that between mandatory and directory
statutes.108 The most that can be said is that such words as "shall,"
"must," tend to negative a very wide scope of discretionary power,
while "may," "shall have authority to," etc., tend even more strongly
10s As in Samuels v. Couzens, supra, n. l; People ex rel. Sheppard v.
Illinois State Board, .mpra, n. 99; People v. Grant, supra, n. loo.
1°4 E. g., State ex rel. Drake v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175 (1876) (insurance
commissioner); Guy L. Wallace & Co. v. Ferguson, 70 Ore. 3o6, 140 Pac.
742 (1914) (same).
105 Supra, n. g8.
1<>6 Supra, n. 100.
11()1 GENY, METHODE n'!N'l'lUlPRE'l'ATION (Ed. 2), §§ 54-59.
1 0s See GoonNow, PRINCIP.!.llS, pp. 295, 296; 26 CYc. 162.
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to support the existence of such power. Yet such language is not
controlling. Thus, permissive language-"may"-is sometimes held
to impose a duty judicially enforceable ;100 while mandatory language has frequently been held not to negative a wide discretionary
power. Thus, in Lloyd v. Ramsay,110 the statute read "he ( Secretary of State) shall :file them," yet the "shall" was qualified by conditions which were held to confer discretionary power. So, in People ex rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board,m the statute read: "But
said board shall at all times issue a license to any regular graduate
of any reputable dental college, without examination, upon the payment by such graduate to the said board of a fee of one dollar."
Yet it was held that the board had discretionary power in determining whether a particular dental college was "reputable." These
examples are not isolated. It seems clear that, in the absence of
express provisions as to judicial control, no literal interpretation
will suffice t~ determine the broad question whether the legislature
has conferred a certain discretionary power upon an official in the
discharge of a particular function.
12. Words Denoting Mental Operation. Of somewhat greater
force in the interpretation of statutes is the use therein of words
denoting mental operation on the part of the official. Thus, in
Lloyd v. Ramsay, the statute contained such phrases as "if he is
satisfied that," "if he is of opinion that," "if the council determines
that," and this ·1anguage is emphasized by the court. In Samitels v.
Coitzens, no such words are found, except the provision that the
applicant must agree that the license "may be revoked at the will
of the mayor." Usually such language is taken to indicate that the
statute· confers discretionary power.
At first blush, it seems absurd to say that the mere fact that the
legislature authorizes an official to use his mind in performing his
official functions implies that he is to be "elevated to the bench,"
so to speak, and that his decisions are to be conclusive against judicial attack. No official can perform even the simplest official act
without reaching a mental decision, and one might assume that the
loo Mayor v. Furze, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 612; GooDNOW,
THI;.M:ECHANICS OF LAW MAKING, p. 121.
110 Supra, n. 2.
111

Supra, n. 99.

op. cit., p. 2g6; '!LB£R'.l',
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legislature contemplated some mental operation on the part of the
official in every case. Such an assumption would probably not be
correct; legislatures are (or perhaps were) conspicuously thoughtless as to methods of administration; and the prevailing attitude of
the courts has been that statut!!s are interpreted and applied more
or less mechanically.112 _
Where, however, the decision of the official is made .a condition
precedent to the performance of an official act affecting individual
interests, the official is in a position to plead his own decision as a
defense to a mandamus proceeding or an action for damages, and
thus escape liability to the injured individual. In other words, his
decision in reference to the particular subject gives him a privilege
or immunity, and thus he has discretionary'power. Warne v. Varley113 is a leading case. A statute authorized defendants to seize
skins that were not thoroughly dried. In an action of trespass for
seizing plaintiff's skins, defendants pleaded the statutes and that
in their jiedgment th"ey were not thoroughly dried. The plea was
held bad on demurrer, the court saying that the statute did not
authorize defendants to seize any leather which was thoroughly
dried, and intimating that if the words "in their judgment" had
been in the statute the seizure would have been upheld. The privilege was held to be co-extensive with the power. On the other hand,
in Sea;m.an v. Patten,114 a meat inspector was held privileged in
refusing to approve me_at on the express ground that the statute
read, "if in his opinion," "as shall appear to him," etc. A literal
interpretation of such a statute sustains the conciusion that the individual's right is conditioned on the decision of the official.
However, the official may be held not to possess a privilege or
immunity in relation to an infured individual, even though the statute contains words of mental operation, such as "in his judgment."115
Pound, "Enforcement of Law," 20 Gru>i>N BAG, 404
6 Durn. & E. 443 (17g5). See also Miller v. Horton, siipra,' n. 6g, a
better reasoned opinion.
1142 Caines (N. Y.), 312 (18o5). An interesting example is found in Kansas Home Ins. Co. v. Wilder, 43 Kan. 731, 23 Pac. 1o61 (1890), where the
amendment to the statute striking out the words "if he shall find that" was
held practically to have annulled a prior decision of th~ supreme court that
the insurance commissioner had discretionary power in the particular instance.
ltG Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W, 942 (1904) (action for dam112

11a

MINISTERIAL OFFICIAL ACTS

On the other hand, the absence of such phrases is not conclusive
against the existence of discretionary power. 116
13. Definiteness or, Indefiniteness of the B,tatittory Administrative
Norm. Statutes conferring official power may or may not lay down
or designate the terms upon which the official is to exercise it, the
norm which is to be applied by the official in the exercise of his
power. If they do, the power is regulated; if they do not, it is
unregulated. Such norms vary greatly in definiteness. Much of
the talk about "questions of law" and "questions of fact," in regard
to judicial review of administrative decisions, resolves itself into a
question of the degree of definiteness of the administrative norm.117
The hard and fast distinction between these two classes of questions appears to be based upon the assumptions of mediaeval logic,118
or upon the Kantian metaphysics of noitmenon and phenomenon.
No hard and fast line can be drawn; the most satisfactory mode of
treatment seems to be to classify the statutory provisions on the
basis of degrees of indefiniteness.
Professor Freund has recently given an excellent classification of
this sort.'J.10 He gives three classes: "precisely measured terms,
abstractions of common certainty, and terms involving an appeal
to judgment or a question of degree." The present writer prefers
a slightly different classification into "rules," "principles," and
"standards," on the basis of the classification of legal norms recently
advocated by Dean Pound.120 The difference between the two classifications is chiefly in the third class. Any attempt to elaborate the
difference would be beyond the scope of the present discussion. An
example must suffice. A term such as "against public policy,"
found in the statute in Lloyd v. Ramsay,121 would fall in Professor
ages against health officer). The nature of the interest affected influences
the judicial attitude in this class of cases. See supra, subdivision 4, and n. 50.
116 See, for example, People ex rel. v. Illinois State Board, supra, n. 99;
Devin v. Belt, 70 Md. 352, 17 Atl. 375 (1899) (liquor license); Decatur v.
Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (1840) (Secretary of Navy, pension).
117 See Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 30 YAL~
L. JoUR. 781.
11s See Isaacs, "The Law and the Facts," 22 Coi.mrnIA L. R.Ev. 1.
119 Freund, "The Use of Indefinite Term~ in Statutes," 30 YAI.~ L.
]OUR. 437.
120 Pound, "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards," 44
AM. BAR ASSN. REP. 445.
121 Supra, n. 2.
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. Freund's third class, but would not fall in Dean Pound's third class,
"standards." It seems bett~r to regard such a- provision as not laying down any legal norm at all, as a case of "unregulated" discretionary power. On the other hand, such a term as "reputable college,"122 which Professor Freund places in his third class, seems to
set up a "standard" calling for the exercise of expert judgment and
yet limiting the scope of the inquiry and Circumscribing the grounds
of action in a much greater degree than does "against public policy"
in the other statute.
At all events, the courts are much more likely to find that the
statute confers discretionary power where the terms or norm of
the statute are indefinite than where they are definite and sharply
defined.123 Professor Freund probably does not overstate the case
when he says: "The use of indefinite or flexible terms in tI:ie grant
of official powers means the grant of discretionary powers." 124 On
the other hand, where the statute lays down a definite norm to guide
official action, the courts will tend to hold that the power is not discretionary,125 although the definiteness of the statute is not in all
cases held to be conclusive against the existence of discretionary
power.126
The first part of the much-quoted definition in Flournoy v. J effersonville,121 "A ministerial act may, perhaps, be defined to ·be one
which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without***"
is probably an attempt to state this distinction between definite and
indefinite statutory norms.. And the corresponding definition of
"discretionary act" embodies the same idea: "When an officer is
ordered by law to do certain things, but the law is general in its
122 People ex rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board, s1tpra, n.
1 2a

99.

Ibid.; Devin v. Belt, supra, n. u6. The decisions that support this

conclusion are numerous.
124 30 YAI.:€ L. JoUR. 451. But see Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (a case
often cited), where the statute contained such indefinite terms as "respectable freeholders,'' "good moral character."
125 People v. May, 251 Ill. 54, 95 N. E. 999 (19u) ("resident surety'') ;
Stephens v. Jones, 24 S. D. 97, 123 N. W. 705 (1909); Roberts v. U. S.,
supra, n. 75.
126 U. S. v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1888) ; Decatur v. Paulding, mpra,
n. n6.
127 S1tpra.
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phraseology, so that the application of it involves inquiry and decision, then it is said the duty is a discretionary one." 128
In a way this result is absurd; it seems directly contrary to what
one would expect of .the courts in their role of guardians of individual interests against oppressive action of executive officials. The
more definite the statutory norm, the easier its application, and
hence the less the danger of error and oppression by an honest but'
over-zealous official. The more obvious, too, will be the official's
violation of the statutory norm, and the easier will be the appeal to
the non-judicial agencies of control, if these are worth anything.
On the other hand, the more indefinite norm will be more difficult
to apply and will offer greater opportunities of error by honest
officials, to say nothing of discrimination and favoritism by di~honest
ones.129 This line of reasoning has sometimes been taken by courts,
not to prove that the official's action is subject to judicial control,
but as indicating that the absence of judicial control over such indefinite powers renders the provision unconstitutional.130 However, the
decided trend of recent authority is to support the constitutionality
of such statutes,131 and the decided trend of legislative practice is
to use them more and more.
But if we look at the problem functionally, and assume that the
legislature has so look~d at it, the distinction is more intelligible.
The problem is to discriminate "* * * between cases where the
administration must take the law from the legislature direct and
others where, owing to the special information at its (the administrative official's) command, the legislature must be content to leave
it to the administration to work out in detail the principles which
§ 34said in State v. Governor, 25 N. J. L. 331, 350 (1856) (mandamus
against the governor denied) : "If this be the test, it follows that wherever
the executive duty is clear the judiciary is authorized to interfere; but in
aU cases of doubt or difficulty, or uncertainty, the responsibility of acting
rests upon the executive alone."
1 3 o Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 Cal. 466, 67 Pac. 755 (1902) ("to a great
extent" too indefinite) ; Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 25 App.
(D. C.) 443 (1905) ; Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 750, 63 S. W.
785 (1901); Welch v. Maryland Casualty Co., 47 Okla. 293, 147 Pac. ro46
(1915) ("suitable person" as insurance agent).
131 Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387
(1915), 7 IowA L. Bur,. 38, 39.
128 WYAfAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
129 As
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alone the former is in a position to prescribe by statute * * *"132 In
other words, indefinite terms in statutes indicate that the legislature
has delegated to the administrative tribunal the function of further
amplifying the legislative policy, and the negative conception of
"separation of powers" leads to the conclusion that the courts cannot interfere with the legislative delegate in the exercise of his
delegated powers. If this analysis be correct, the conclusion that
indefinite statutes mean discretionary powers rests upon two assumptions : first, that the legislature has deliberately chosen indefinite
rather than definite terms in order to more fully effectuate its
policies; and second, that the statute delegates legislative power in
greater or less degree. The latter assumption runs counter to the
dogma that legislative powers cannot be delegated; but this dogma,
though not expressly repudiated, no longer constitutes a serious
obstacle, so far as judicial decisions are concerned, to indefinite
terms in statutes. The first assumption seems scarcely justified by
present legislative practices. While considerable progress has been
made in legislative drafting, there is still the need for accurate
information as to types of administrative provisions and the exercise
of a careful choice as to the type to be used in a particular statute.
Professor Freund has recently presented an admirable preliminary
summary of such information,133 which should be of great value to
the legislative draftsman in making the deliberate choice which the
foregoing theory presupposes.
·
r4. Unregulated and Uncontrolled Discretionary Power. In the
absence of a legal norm in the statute, which the official is to apply
in performing his official acts, his power is l!nregulated. It by no
means follows that it is never to be subjected to judicial control.
It is sometimes said :-"Discretion may be defined, when applied to
public officials, as the power or right conferred upon them by law
of acting officially, under certain circumstances, solely according
to the dictates of their judgment and conscience." 134
132

GHosE, CoMPARA'l'm An:r.trnis'tRATm LAw, p. 588.
Appendix C, Report of the Special Committee on Legislative Drafting, American Bar Association, I92r- meeting.
134 33 HARV. L. REv. 465. The case cited to support this statement, State
v. Hultz, I06 Mo. 4I, 50, I6 S. W. 940 (I89I), involves discretion in making
an apportionment of jury elisors by the court; and the ·opinion distinctly
states that the decision would be subject to review if "arbitrary or unjust."
133
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This statement is too broad. In a case of regulated discretion,
the statutory norm delimits the scope of the discretionary power,
and acts in excess of that power are subject to judicial control as
"abuse of discretion". In a case of unregulated discretion, how
can the court determine when the official has exceeded his power,
has abused his discretion? This question used to bother the courts,
and at one time there was a decided tendency to declare unconsti- tutional grants of unregulated discretionary power.135 However,
the decided weight of authority today is to the contrary,136 and the
question of unregulated discretion has passed from the realm of
constitutional law to the domain of legislative policy.136a
The power of an official who acts with entire freedom from judicial control may be called "uncontrolled". This does not mean
that he is entirely free to act as he pleases, for he will always be
subject in greater or less degree to some form of non-judicial control-political, administrative, legislative, etc. ; and he will likewise
be subjected, as a rule (the chief executive may be an exception),
to criminal prosecution for bribery, corruption and perhaps other
statutory offenses involving gross misfeasance in office. "Uncontrolled" is thus a relative term. However, in view of 'the absence
of effective administrative control in our decentralised state administrations, and of the feebleness of other forms of control, the absence of judicial control means practically a wide opportunity for
oppressive administrative action affecting individual interests. Consequently, examples of uncontrolled discretionary power should be,
at least until effective administrative control is provided, rare. The
power of appointment to public office is a prominent example of
such power.
Unregulated discretionary power 'is found in two forms: first,
where the statute contains no language specifying the grounds or
facts upon which, or the purposes toward which, administrative ac1sG Yick Wo v. Hopkins, u8 U. S. 356 (1886), is the 1eading -case. See
also Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, supra, n. 130; Welch v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
supra, n. 130.
136 Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32, 19 Sup. Ct. 317 ( 1899).
See
Powell, "Administrative Exercise of the Police Power," 24 HARV. L. REv.,
at pp. 277-8; 21 COLUMBIA L. REv. 275, 819.
136• Thus approaching close to the position which in England is openly
recognized. See Ir.BERT, THE MECHANICS OF LAW MAKI~G, p. 145.
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tion is to be taken. Samuels v. Couzens131 presentS' an example of
this sort. The ordinance laid down no conditions upon which an
individual was to be granted a jeweler's license; and the individual
was required to 'agree (which would be tantamount to a provision
in the ordinance ;138 that it should be revocable "at the will of the
mayor''. The only clue to the purpose of the licensing power (aside
from the smallness of the license fee) was the provision that a bond.
should be given to cover loss to a citizen doing business with the
licensee. This would indicate that the object of the ordinance was
regulatory, and was to protect the customers of the licensee against
some form of conduct by the licensee which would cause them loss
or damage. The reasons given by the mayor for his refusal-that
the applicant had deceived and defrauded the public-fall clearly
within this implied purpose. The court did not concede the mayor
uncontrolled discretion, since it is distinctly said that the ordinance
confers a "reasonable discretion". One would like to know, however, how the court would deal with a C?-Se arising under this ordinance where the mayor's refusal was based on the inexperience or
incompetency of an honest applicant, br upon the ground that there
were too many jewelers in Detroit already.130 The court would then
be called upon to formulate a half-baked legislative policy, to fill
a vacuum in the legislative mind. It is a task for which courts
are not well fitted.
The second type of unregulated discretionary power is exemplified by<'statutes which lay down the conditions of the exercise of
that power in language so indefinite that it does not rise to the degree of expressiveness of a legal rule, a principle, or a standard.
Lloyd v. Ramsay140 involves this type of statute. "Against public
policy" does little more than indicate that the power is to be exercised t~ secure social interests as distinguished from the interests
of particular official favorites ; but it is a wholly unformulated policy. The word "hon~_st" ~Y~ a clue to this policy, but does not
• 1s1 Supra, n. I.

1as See Metropolitan Mille & Cream Co. v. New York, 113 App. Div. 377,

98 N. Y. Supp. 894 (19o6).
1ao E. g., in People v. Grant, supra, n. 99, it was held that the mayor had·
power to refuse an auctioneer's license on this ground.
140 Supra, n. 2.
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necessarily restrict the power of refusal to cases of actual dishonesty. There was, in fact, no direct evidence in that case to show
that the incorporators had any dishonest purposes; and the record
shows (though the published report does not) that the Secretary
of State had previously issued certificates of incorporation to othet:
cQmpanies (not oil companies, however) with a similar disparity
between the amounts of common and preferred stock. Here again
the court was obliged to formulate the unformulated policy fo the
extent that the particular case demanded. The opinion clearly indicates that neither the Secretary nor the Executive Council is given
uncontrolled power.
Statutes conferring unregulated discretionary power are becoming more .common. The judicial veto is being withdrawn; such
statutes are no longer declared unconstitutional per se, without
regard to the way in which they are applied in the particular case.
There is a real danger that the judicial abdication in favor of executive justice will go too far, that unregulated power will become
uncontrolled. Herein lies a menace to the common law tradition
of the supremacy of law ;141 for, as Coke says in his commentary
on Chap. 29 of Magna Charta :-" * * * hereby the crooked cord
of that which is called discretion appeareth to be unlawful, unless
you take it, as it ought to be, di.scretio est discernere per lege'J1!,
quid sit jitstmn." 142

IR view of the amorphous C?ndition of that mass of juristic materials which some of us are bold enough to call "administrative
law," it may seem futile to •offer proposals of reform, to do, more
than sit and \yatch the rising tide of executive justice. Yet this is
no time for "£utilitarianism". The spirit of the times is that the
administration of justice can be improved through conscious human
effort. "There will be no withdrawing from these experiments. We
shall expand them whether we approve theoretically or not . . . " 143
The immediate task of the lawyer is to develop the technique of
administrative justice, not only of the administrative .itself, but of
the legislature and the courts.
The following conclusions are submitted with deference:PouND, THJ~ SPIRIT oF THE COMMON LAw, p. 7 and Chap. III.
Con's Sr:coNn INsTrrUTr:S, I, p. 56.
Ha RooT, AnnR:ESsr:s ON Govr:RNMENT AND CrTrzr:NSHIP, p. 533.
141

142
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I. 1;'.he terms "ministerial act" or "ministerial duty" and "discretionary act" or "discretionary duty" either have no meaning or
so many meanings that they are useless, and should be discarded.
2. The term "discretionary power'', a purely analytical concept.
is more useful, and is corning into use in place of the terms just
mentioned.
3. "Discretionary power" means the power of an official to create a privilege or immunity against direct judicial attack by an aggrieved individual.
4. Statutes should be so drawn as to express: (a) The norms
to be applied by the official invested with power; (b) the method
and extent of judicial control.
5. A system of administrative appeals should be provided by
which a review may be had of those questions of "expediency," or
"fact," which fall within the cope of discretionary power, and
·therefore beyond the scope of judicial control. The appeal to the
Executive Council in Lloyd v. Ranisay is an example.
6. On the other hand, the courts should not abandon the task,
difficult though it is, of circumscribing unregulated discretionary
power.
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